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ABSTRACT
The COVID-19 pandemic has affected the way businesses run
and operate in the United States. With the dire need to keep
employees safe, digital contact tracing has become the most
efficient mechanism for controlling the spread of the virus
within places of employment. However, information privacy
laws come into tension with the use of employee health data by
employers and third parties. This Article proposes a careful
balance between contact tracing and maintaining employees’
privacy as they share health and proximity data with digital
contact tracing applications in the workplace.
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1. INTRODUCTION
When the deadly smallpox virus was eliminated worldwide after
centuries of infection, popular belief dictated that its eradication
was due to global immunization.1 In reality, it was extensive
1

History of Smallpox, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/smallpox/history/history.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2020);
Contact Tracing, CLIMATE CHANGE AND PUB. HEALTH L. SITE AT LA. STATE
UNIV. https://biotech.law.lsu.edu/Books/lbb/x578.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2020)
[hereinafter Contact Tracing].
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contact tracing that facilitated the eradication of smallpox.2 At the
time, contact tracing depended on a team of investigators
interviewing the patient, along with the patient’s family, friends,
and any other people who may have known of the patient’s close
contacts who may have been exposed.3 The patient’s close
contacts were discerned and were then subjected to control
measures such as quarantine, vaccination, or treatment.4 Now,
forty years after the success of smallpox contact tracing, digital
contact tracing has taken over as a cost-effective and less laborintensive technological upgrade.5 In light of the COVID-19
pandemic, digital contact tracing can be used to stop or slow down
the spread of the virus.6
However, the emergence of digital contact tracing
applications and mechanisms in the workplace can have far
reaching implications for the health privacy of employees.
Unresolved questions are raised, especially regarding whether
employers will be able to access their employees’ location data,
various symptoms and health information, and the data of
employees’ close contacts.7 Digital contact tracing may also
implicate various information privacy principles and laws, as well
as privacy provisions found within statutes like the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Although there are privacy issues
associated with digital contact tracing that the United States may
not be prepared to address, employers will likely opt to use these
mechanisms.8
2

Contact Tracing, supra note 1.
Digital Contact Tracing, CORONAVIRUS TODAY
https://www.coronavirustoday.com/digital-contact-tracing (last visited Nov. 26,
2020) [hereinafter Digital Contact Tracing].
4
Id.
5
Tracking COVID-19: Contact Tracing in the Digital Age, WORLD HEALTH
ORG. (Sept. 9, 2020), https://www.who.int/news-room/featurestories/detail/tracking-covid-19-contact-tracing-in-the-digital-age.
6
Id.
7
Digital Contact Tracing, supra note 3.
8
Andy Green, Complete Guide to Privacy Laws in the U.S., VARONIS (March
29, 2020), https://www.varonis.com/blog/us-privacy-laws/ (noting that there is
no federal privacy law that can force companies to issue and comply with
privacy policies).
3
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Due to stay-at-home orders in 2020, more than half of small
businesses in the United States had temporarily closed.9 As
businesses began to reopen their doors, employers had the difficult
task of preventing a COVID-19 outbreak, which would likely shut
certain businesses down for good.10 With several big businesses
opting for digital contact tracing to keep their workplace COVID19-free, as well as the release of a digital contact tracing
application by Apple and Google, questions of privacy and
personal health information are especially urgent.11
Part I of this Article discusses the framework of information
privacy principles that make up the privacy laws in the United
States, examines notable regulations and statutes regarding the
privacy of health information, and analyzes their connection to
each other. Part II demonstrates the potential negative impact of
digital contact tracing tools in the workplace; namely, the potential
threats to employee privacy. Finally, Part III attempts to mitigate
privacy concerns, and proposes making COVID-19 a disability
under the ADA, passing a federal law with common information
privacy principles incorporated, and facilitating communication
between employers and federal and local health agencies.
I. CURRENT PROTECTIONS FOR HEALTH INFORMATION
PRIVACY

9

Andrew Soergel, More Than Half of Small Businesses Closed Temporarily
Amid Coronavirus Outbreak, U.S. NEWS (May 5, 2020),
https://www.usnews.com/news/economy/articles/2020-05-05/more-than-half-ofsmall-businesses-closed-temporarily-amid-coronavirus-outbreak.
10
See generally, Anne Sraders & Lance Lambert, Nearly 100,000
Establishments that Temporarily Shut Down Due to the Pandemic are Now Out
of Business, FORTUNE (Sept. 28, 2020), https://fortune.com/2020/09/28/covidbuisnesses-shut-down-closed/.
11
Apple and Google Partner on COVID-19 Contact Tracing Technology, APPLE
NEWSROOM (Apr. 10, 2020), https://www.apple.com/newsroom/2020/04/appleand-google-partner-on-covid-19-contact-tracing-technology/; see also, Kif
Leswing, As Workplaces Slowly Reopen, Tech Companies Smell a New MultiBillion Dollar Opportunity: Helping Businesses Trace Coronavirus, CNBC
(May 10, 2020), https://www.cnbc.com/2020/05/10/coronavirus-tracing-forworkplaces-could-become-new-tech-opportunity.html.
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The Personal Identifiable Information (“PII”) of employees
is protected by several different mechanisms. These include
information privacy principles that federal laws, federal
regulations, and state laws are based on.12 These principles, laws,
and regulations work concurrently with federal statutes and
regulations geared toward medical and health information
specifically, such as the ADA and advisory opinions and
regulations promulgated by the Centers for Disease Control
(“CDC”) and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”). Part I.A discusses the Fair Information Practice
Principles, notable information privacy statutes, and federal bills as
they relate to digital contact tracing for the COVID-19 pandemic.
Part I.B discusses the EEOC and the ADA’s protections for
employees’ medical information.
Part I.C examines how
employers may use digital contact tracing applications to track
COVID-19 in the workplace and protect employees from infection.
A. The Fair Information Practice Principles and U.S. Information
Privacy Law
While the U.S. Constitution protects certain aspects of privacy, and
there are “sector- and harm-specific privacy laws,” there is no
general comprehensive federal law governing information privacy
in the United States.13 However, the Fair Information Practice
Principles (“FIPPs”) act as guiding privacy values that are widely
incorporated into United States privacy law.
1.

History of the Fair Information Practice Principles

The FIPPs are a set of widely accepted and internationally
recognized principles that serve as the basis for information
privacy policies within the government and the private sector in the
See generally Fair Information Practice Principles, FED. TRADE COMM’N
(Mar. 31, 2009),
https://web.archive.org/web/20090331134113/http:/www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy
3/fairinfo.shtm.
13
Lothar Determann, Healthy Data Protection, 26 MICH. TELECOMMS. AND
TECH. L. REV. 229, 241 (2020).
12
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United States and abroad.14 The FIPPs’ core principles were
modeled after the Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development’s (“OECD”) Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy
and Transborder Flows of Personal Data.15 The OECD is an
international organization geared toward shaping policy for a range
of social and economic issues, including work on privacy policy
and the FIPPs, which were written in 1980.16 Congress first
incorporated the FIPPs into the Fair Credit Reporting Act, which
promotes “accuracy, fairness, and privacy” of information in files
of consumer reporting agencies, including credit bureaus and
agencies that sell information about medical records, rental history
records, and check writing histories.17 The FIPPs were also
NAT’L PUBLIC SAFETY P’SHIP, THE FAIR INFO. PRACTICE PRINCIPLES (FIPPS)
IN THE INFORMATION SHARING ENVIRONMENT (ISE) 1,
https://www.nationalpublicsafetypartnership.org/Documents/The_Fair_Informat
ion_Practice_Principles_in_the_Information_Sharing_Environment.pdf =;
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2008-01, PRIVACY POLICY GUIDANCE
MEMORANDUM (2008). The Department of Homeland Security is one of the
federal departments and agencies that have adopted the FIPPs. Id.
15
OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of
Personal Data, ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [hereinafter OECD
Guidelines]
https://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivac
yandtransborderflowsofpersonaldata.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2020) [hereinafter
OECD Guidelines]; Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, Jonathan Gray & Mireille
van Eechoud, Open Data, Privacy, and Fair Information Principles: Towards A
Balancing Framework, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 2073, 2102 (2015); see
Members and Partners, ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners (last visited Oct. 3, 2020) for a
list of OECD member countries. The OECD, an intergovernmental economic
organization with thirty-seven member countries, expanded on the original
four FIPPs and adopted a more comprehensive version of eight principles in
1980. Id.; Erin Corken, The Changing Expectation of Privacy: Keeping Up with
the Millennial Generation and Looking Toward the Future, 42 N. KY. L. REV.
287, 291 (2015).
16
OECD Privacy Guidelines, ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,
http://www.oecd.org/digital/ieconomy/privacy-guidelines.htm (last visited Nov
22, 2020).
17
Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1128
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x (2012)); see FED. TRADE
COMM’N, A SUMMARY OF YOUR RIGHTS UNDER THE FAIR CREDIT REPORTING
ACT, https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/pdf-0096-fair-credit-reporting14
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incorporated into the Privacy Act of 1974, which established fair
information practices governing “the collection, maintenance, use,
and dissemination of information” maintained in federal agency
records.18 Years later, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and
the Obama Administration called for FIPPs-centered privacy
regulation in the public and private sectors.19 Through studies of
methods implemented by entities to collect, use, and safeguard
personal information, the FIPPs continued to evolve.20 Now the
FIPPs are widely utilized by various federal agencies and are used
as the framework for state privacy laws. The five commonly
accepted FIPPs in the United States, as formulated by the FTC,
include: (1) notice/awareness; (2) choice/ consent; (3) access/
participation; (4) integrity/ security; and (5) enforcement/ redress.21
act.pdf (last visited 11/5/2020) for more information about the Fair Credit
Reporting Act.
18
5 U.S.C. § 552a; DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRIVACY ACT OF 1974,
https://www.justice.gov/opcl/privacy-act-1974 (last updated Jan. 15, 2020);
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2008-02, PRIVACY POLICY GUIDANCE
MEMORANDUM (2008).
19
See generally Borgesius et al., supra note 15, at 2101–08, for the background
and history of the FIPPs in the United States and abroad; OFF. OF THE
PRESIDENT, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD: A
FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE
GLOBAL DIGITAL ECONOMY (2012); FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING
CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS (2012); OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC.
OFF. OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB MEMORANDUM M-13-13, OPEN DATA POLICY –
MANAGING INFORMATION AS AN ASSET (May 9, 2013) (delineating
implementation guidance material for former President Obama's 2013 executive
order).
20
Nicholas Camillo & Devika Kornbacher, Fair Information Practice Principles
in Data Privacy Law, 2019 ADVANCED INTELL. PROP. L. 3.2, 2019 WL 8275404.
21
Fair Information Practice Principles, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Mar. 31, 2009),
https://web.archive.org/web/20090331134113/http:/www.ftc.gov/reports/privacy
3/fairinfo.shtm. The five FIPPs that will be discussed in this Artcileote are
formulated by the FTC as the principles common to all regulations and guidance
related to the FIPPs. Id.; cf. Corken, supra note 15, at 291 (citing OECD
Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal
Data, Org. Econ. Co-Operation & Dev.,
http://www.oecd.org/internet/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacy
an); cf. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., The Fair Information Practice Principles at
Work (June 2011),
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Data minimization is also a common principle used to rein in
entities’ data collection policies.22
2. The Fair Information Practice Principles Explained
The notice and awareness principle dictates that individuals should
receive notice of an entity’s information practices prior to the
collection of their personal information.23 This ensures that
individuals can make informed decisions as to whether to disclose
the information sought, and to what extent to disclose it.24 The
FTC recommends the issuance of understandable and concise
privacy notices divulging the identification of the entity collecting
the data, the uses of the data, the recipients of the data, the nature
and means of the data collection, and the steps taken to ensure
confidentiality, integrity, and quality of the data.25 Entities may
also be required to identify any choice individuals have regarding
the use of their data, their rights to access the data and correct any
inaccuracies, and the availability of redress for violations of the
respective information privacy policy.26 Meaningful notice and
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/dhsprivacy_fippsfactsheet.p
df (discussing the FIPPs as formulated and utilized in DHS privacy practices).
22
Data Minimization, TREND MICRO,
https://www.trendmicro.com/vinfo/us/security/definition/Data-Minimization
(last visited Nov. 22, 2020).
23
FED. TRADE COMM’N, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS (1998),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/privacy-online-reportcongress/priv-23a.pdf [hereinafter A Report to Congress].
24
Id.; Corken, supra note 15, at 290.
25
See, e.g., A Report to Congress, supra note 23; Ben Davis, GDPR: How to
create best practice privacy notices (with examples) (July 17, 2017),
https://econsultancy.com/gdpr-best-practice-privacy-notices-examples/. The
GDPR is the European Union’s privacy and security law utilizing data
protection principles similar to the FIPPs, including transparency to individuals.
Ben Wolford, What is GDPR, the EU’s new data protection law?,
https://gdpr.eu/what-is-gdpr/?cn-reloaded=1 (last visited Dec. 5, 2020).
26
A Report to Congress, supra note 23; David Hoffman & Paula J. Bruening,
Rethinking Privacy: Fair Information Practice Principles Reinterpreted 13–14,
INTEL, https://bigdata.fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Intel-RethinkingPrivacy.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 2020); see also Woodrow Hartzog, The
Inadequate, Invaluable Fair Information Practices, 76 MD. L. REV. 952, 980
(2017) (noting that design, in addition to words, should also be considered when
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awareness is required for the application of the remaining four
FIPPs. Without it, individuals do not have knowledge regarding
the use of their data, and thus are powerless to control it.27
The second FIPP, choice and consent, refers to individuals’
ability to determine how any personal information collected from
them can be used, especially regarding secondary uses of
information.28 Secondary uses of personal information are any uses
beyond those “necessary to complete the contemplated
transaction,” including internal use within the entity or external
use, when data is transferred to a third party.29 Entities may apply
opt-in or opt-out regimes to their privacy policies.30 Opt-in regimes
require individuals to affirmatively allow the collection and use of
their information, and opt-out, or tacit consent, regimes require
individuals to affirmatively forbid the collection and use of such
information for internal or external uses.31 Within these regimes,
entities can offer individuals greater choice by allowing them to
tailor the nature of the information collected and the uses that
information will be put to by specifying their preferences.32
The access and participation principle refers to individuals’
ability to access their own data, and to contest the accuracy or
completeness of it.33 The FTC recommends that access be timely,
inexpensive, and relatively simple to give individuals a meaningful
deciding if the notice given was sufficient).
27
See, e.g., A Report to Congress, supra note 23; Steven Hetcher, The FTC as
Internet Privacy Norm Entrepreneur, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2041, 2049 n.29 (2000).
28
A Report to Congress, supra note 23.
29
Id.; see also Thomas Gallagher, Kudakwashe Dube & Scott McLachlan,
Ethical Issues in Secondary Use of Personal Health Information (May 2018),
https://cmte.ieee.org/futuredirections/tech-policy-ethics/may2018/ethical-issuesin-secondary-use-of-personal-health-information/ (discussing how personal
health information may be used by third parties).
30
A Report to Congress, supra note 23.
31
Id.; Jan Bouckaert & Hans Degryse, Opt In Versus Opt Out: A Free-Entry
Analysis of Privacy Policies (Dec. 16, 2005),
https://www.econinfosec.org/archive/weis2006/docs/34.pdf.
32
A Report to Congress, supra note 23.
33
Id.; Pam Dixon, A Brief Introduction to Fair Information Practices (June 5,
2006), https://www.worldprivacyforum.org/2008/01/report-a-brief-introductionto-fair-information-practices/ (discussing the access/participation principle
under the name “individual participation”).
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ability to see and change the data that was collected.34
The integrity and security principle recommends that data
collectors take reasonable steps to ensure data integrity and protect
against loss, unauthorized access, use, destruction, and disclosure
of data.35 This can be achieved by using reputable sources of data,
complying with the access and participation principle to allow
correction, destroying untimely data, and limiting third party
access through the encryption and secure storage of collected
information.36
Finally, enforcement and redress ensures that the FIPPs are
implemented and individuals can obtain relief for violations.37
These goals may be met by: (1) self-regulation, (2) government
enforcement, and (3) private remedies.38 Self-regulation in entities
can include audits, which allow entities to link the misuse of
information collected to a particular source.39 This allows victims
to get recourse and acts as a deterrent against the data abuser.40
With an auditing mechanism, entities can investigate and
compensate individuals for the harm suffered by the unauthorized
collection or misuse of their information.41 Government
enforcement via federal agencies or legislation is also a means to
redress data misuse and other data violations.42 Such enforcement
34

A Report to Congress, supra note 23.
Id.; Dixon, supra note 33 (defining the integrity/security principle under the
name “security safeguards principle”).
36
A Report to Congress, supra note 23; see also NATIONAL PUBLIC SAFETY
PARTNERSHIP, supra note 14.
37
A Report to Congress, supra note 23; Steven Hetcher, Changing the Social
Meaning of Privacy in Cyberspace, 15 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 149, 182 (2001).
38
A Report to Congress, supra note 23.
39
Id.
40
Id.; FED. TRADE COMM’N, INDIVIDUAL REFERENCE SERVICES – A REPORT TO
CONGRESS (1997).
41
A Report to Congress, supra note 23.
42
Id.; U.S. DEP'T. OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE, SEC'S ADVISORY COMM.
ON AUTOMATED PERS. DATA SYSTEMS, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS
OF CITIZENS (1973) https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=479784 [hereinafter
RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS] (advocating for the
inception of a federal agency to regulate the use of all automated personal data
systems); U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERV., INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE
TASK FORCE, INFO. POLICY COMM., PRIV. WORKING GROUP, PRIVACY AND THE
35
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often comes from the FTC, which can levy penalties for unfair data
practices.43 Finally, private litigants can similarly rely on a
statutory scheme that provides private rights to litigate.44
Individuals harmed by the violation of information privacy
practices or unfair data collection could thus recover via
compensatory or punitive damages.45
Data minimization, as another regulatory principle related
to privacy policy, involves limiting data collection to only what is
required to fulfill a specific purpose.46 Essentially, the principle
requires that entities use only the least amount of data possible.
With regard to contact tracing applications, this would require only
the use of proximity data for the purpose of informing other users
of the application that they had been in close contact with someone
who tested positive or exhibited symptoms of COVID-19.47
3. Notable State Privacy Statutes and Bills
The five FIPPs are interrelated and work together in information
privacy regulations, statutes, and policies binding federal agencies
and private entities. Several states have adopted information
privacy laws including the California Consumer Privacy Act
(“CCPA”).48 Moreover, other states are entertaining bills that
NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: PRINCIPLES FOR PROVIDING AND
USING PERSONAL INFORMATION (1995), https://aspe.hhs.gov/privacy-andnational-information-infrastructure-principles-providing-and-using-personalinformation (noting regulatory enforcement and criminal prosecution as options
for redress).
43
FTC Imposes $5 Billion Penalty and Sweeping New Privacy Restrictions on
Facebook, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Jul. 24, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2019/07/ftc-imposes-5-billion-penalty-sweeping-newprivacy-restrictions.
44
A Report to Congress, supra note 23.; RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE
RIGHTS OF CITIZENS, supra note 42 (discussing the need for federal legislation
and advocating for uniform state legislation).
45
A Report to Congress, supra note 23.
46
Data Minimization, supra note 22.
47
Johannes Abeler et al., COVID-19 Contact Tracing and Data Protection Can
Go Together (Apr. 20,2020),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7173240/.
48
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100 (West 2020).
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resemble the CCPA.49
The CCPA applies to for-profit companies that do business
in California, have a gross revenue of over twenty-five million
dollars, buy, receive, or sell personal information of fifty thousand
or more California residents, households, or devices, or derive 50
percent or more of their annual revenue from selling the personal
information of California residents.50 The CCPA operates via an
opt-out regime, in which individuals have the right to delete
personal information, request that entities not use personal
information, and obtain notice regarding the type of personal
information collected and how it is being used.51 Any contract
provision attempting to waive these rights is unenforceable.52
Under the CCPA, personal information is broadly defined as
information that “identifies, relates to, describes, is reasonably
capable of being associated with, or could reasonably be linked,
directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer or household.”53
As such, the CCPA includes employment related information.54
As per new regulations that went into effect in August 2020, the
CCPA requires entities to provide consumers with timely notice at
the collection of data that should be understandable to consumers
and inform them of the categories of data to be collected.55 The
notices must use plain, non-legal language, draw the consumers’
attention to the notice, be available in multiple languages, and be
accessible to viewers with disabilities.56 Moreover, entities cannot
collect data which the consumer was not given notice of, and
consumers must be informed of their right to opt-out of
collection.57
Following California’s lead, New York and Massachusetts
49

See S. 5642, 242d Leg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019); S. 120, 191st Sess. (Mass. 2019).
CIV. § 1798.140(c).
51
CIV. § 1798.100.
52
CIV. § 1798.192.
53
CIV. § 1798.140(o)(1).
54
Id. at § 1798.140(o)(1)(I).
55
California Consumer Privacy Act Regulations,
https://oag.ca.gov/sites/all/files/agweb/pdfs/privacy/oal-sub-final-text-ofregs.pdf? (last visited Dec. 20, 2020).
56
Id.
57
Id.
50
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have proposed statutes that resemble the CCPA. New York’s
proposed privacy statute features the right to delete personal
information, and request to see the personal information collected
by an entity, like the CCPA.58 Unlike the CCPA however, the
proposed New York Privacy Act does not have a revenue threshold
for businesses, creates a fiduciary relationship between businesses
and the individuals whose data is used, and allows individuals to
correct inaccurate information.59 The proposed New York law was
not passed in 2019, and is on “hold” as of October 2020.60 The
Massachusetts bill also shares language from the CCPA, and
includes access to personal information, the right to delete
information, the right to opt-out of the sale of information, and
guaranteed notice of privacy rights.61 Unlike the CCPA however,
the Massachusetts bill provides a broader right of redress for
individuals, regardless of monetary loss.62
4. Federal Privacy Bills
The COVID-19 pandemic has created a need for strong data
privacy laws in collaboration with longstanding statutes that
govern health information in the workforce, such as the ADA. 63 In
response, there are two bills before Congress: the Public Health
Emergency Privacy Act (“PHEPA”),64 and the COVID-19
Consumer Data Protection Act (“CCDPA”)65.
The PHEPA governs any federal or private entity that
58

S. 5642, 242d Leg. Sess. § 1103(3)(a) (N.Y. 2019)
Id.
60
Joanna Kessler, Note, Data Protection in the Wake of the GDPR: California’s
Solution for Protecting “The World’s Most Valuable Resource”, 93 S. CAL. L.
REV. 99, 126 (2019) (citing Tim Sandle, New York Lawmakers Reject
Data Privacy Act in Surprise Turn, DIGITAL J. (July 22, 2019),
http://www.digitaljournal.com/tech-and-science/technology/new-yorklawmakers-reject-data-privacy-act-in-surprise-turn/article/554461
[https://perma.cc/32RR-6GF8]).
61
S. 120, 191st Sess. (Mass. 2019).
62
Id.
63
42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–12117.
64
H.R. 6866, 116th Cong. (2020).
65
S. 3663, 116th Cong. (2020).
59
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“collects, uses, or discloses emergency health data” or that
develops a website or an application for the purposes of contact
tracing.66 The proposed act incorporates several FIPPs. Data
minimization is required to ensure that an entity only collects, uses,
and discloses data that is “necessary, proportionate, and limited for
a good faith public health purpose.”67 The access and participation
principle in PHEPA ensures that the information collected by
entities is accurate and that inaccurate information can be corrected
by individuals.68 Finally, reasonable safeguards are included in the
bill to prevent unlawful discrimination on the basis of the health
data collected.69 The proposed act allows the disclosure of health
data to the government when the disclosure is made to a public
health authority in good faith.70 Additionally, PHEPA prohibits
the withholding of employment opportunities on the basis of
emergency health data, requires express consent and clear and
conspicuous notice, and creates private and regulatory forms of
redress for violations of PHEPA.71
The CCDPA is much less broad. It prohibits entities from
collecting, processing, or transferring covered data, including
geolocation, proximity, identifiers, and personal health
information, unless the entity provides prior notice and the
individual expressly consents.72 It also provides that entities must
publish a clear and conspicuous privacy policy, practice data
minimization, offer a right to delete and correct data, and establish
a reasonable security mechanism.73 Unlike the PHEPA, the
CCDPA offers no private right of action, and preempts state law,
so that states cannot pass any laws related to the “collection,
processing, or transfer of covered data” involving tracking the
spread of COVID-19, measuring compliance with social distancing
guidelines, and conducting contact tracing.74 The CCDPA also
66

H.R. 6866 § 2(4)(A).
H.R. 6866 § 3(a)(1)–(3).
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
H.R. 6866 § 3(a)(4).
71
H.R. 6866 §§ 3(b)–(e), 6.
72
S. 3663, 116th Cong. § 3(a) (2020).
73
S. 3663 § 3(d)–(h).
74
S. 3663 § 4(b)(3), § 3(b).
67
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does not apply to data collected by employers.75
According to Skopos Labs, Inc., which predicts the
probability that a bill will pass both chambers of Congress, the
PHEPA and the CCDPA each have only a two percent chance of
enactment.76 However, some experts say that there is a chance
that one of the bills will pass.77 Large technology companies,
including Facebook, Microsoft, Apple, and Google, have
expressed their support for comprehensive federal privacy law.78
B. THE EEOC AND THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
Besides the FIPPs, federal agencies and laws must also be
considered when thinking about information privacy law as it
relates to health information. The EEOC and the ADA are relevant
for the purposes of creating a contact tracing application that does
not infringe on individuals’ right to health privacy.
The EEOC is a federal agency responsible for
enforcing laws prohibiting discrimination in hiring practices on the
basis of “race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, disability,
and genetic information.”79 Laws enforced by the EEOC apply to
hiring, firing, promotions, harassment, training, wages, and
employee benefits.80 Among the laws and regulations enforced by
the EEOC, the ADA is one of the most important protections for
employees.81
The ADA requires employers to reasonably
accommodate employees with statutory disabilities and to refrain
from discriminating against prospective and current employees on
75

S. 3663 § 2(12)(B), § 3(b).
H.R. 6866, 116th Cong.; S. 3633, 116th Cong.
77
Thomas Germain, New Privacy Bills Aim to Protect Health Data During the
Pandemic, CONSUMER REPORTS (May 14, 2020),
https://www.consumerreports.org/health-privacy/dueling-coronavirus-privacybills-could-protect-your-data-during-the-pandemic/.
78
Mitchell Noordyke, Big Tech’s Shift to Privacy, INT’L ASS’N OF PRIV. PROS.,
https://iapp.org/resources/article/big-techs-shift-to-privacy-2/ (last visited Dec.
5, 2020).
79
Overview, EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N,
https://www.eeoc.gov/overview (last visited Sept. 20, 2020).
80
Id.
81
42 U.S.C. §§ 12111-12117.
76
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the basis of disability.82 Although the ADA does not specifically
name all of the impairments that constitute disabilities, it defines
individuals with disabilities as having “a physical or mental
impairment that substantially limits one or more major life
activities,” “a record of such impairment,” or describes those who
are “regarded as having such an impairment.”83 An individual may
establish that they have a disability and are entitled to be covered
pursuant to the ADA under one or more of these prongs.84 Under
the first prong, the standard “substantially limits” is meant to be
construed broadly and is not a demanding standard.85 Generally,
this standard refers to activities that are substantially limited as
compared to most people in the population. An impairment need
not “prevent, or significantly or severely restrict” an individual
from performing a major life activity, but rather less drastic
interruptions to daily life can be considered substantially
limiting.86 Further, an impairment can be labelled a disability even
when there are no symptoms. In Bragdon v. Abbott, the Supreme
Court ruled that the Human Immunodeficiency Virus is a
disability, even before the onset of the symptomatic phase of the
virus, holding that certain major life activities, such as the ability
to reproduce, may still be substantially limited.87
The EEOC has not stated whether it will consider COVID19 to be a disability under the ADA; however, states with
relatively more expansive disability protections, including New
York, have labelled the virus a disability, and there has been at
least one lawsuit requesting that it be considered as such.88 In
82

42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A).
See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1); see also UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE,
CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, INFORMATION AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ON THE
AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT, https://www.ada.gov/ada_intro.htm (last
visited Nov. 5, 2020).
84
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(2).
85
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(i).
86
29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j)(1)(ii).
87
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638 (1998); 42 U.S.C § 12102(1); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(h)(2)(i).
88
Is COVID19 A Disability Under Discrimination Law? The Next Wave of
Workplace Lawsuits May Answer Questions, FISHER PHILLIPS (June 19, 2020)
83

https://www.fisherphillips.com/resources-alerts-is-covid-19-a-
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Tihara Worthy v. Wellington Estates, an employee alleged that she
was wrongfully terminated and prevented from returning to work
because of her previous COVID-19 positive status.89 The plaintiff
sought to have COVID-19 be considered a disability under New
Jersey law.90 The ADA restricts an employer’s ability to ask
potential or current employees about their disabilities and to
require medical examinations.91 It also prohibits employers from
excluding individuals with disabilities unless they pose a
significant risk of harm to other employees within the company,92
and requires reasonable accommodations for individuals with
disabilities during epidemics and contagious viral outbreaks,
including permitting working from home.93
Although it is unclear whether COVID-19 will be
considered a statutory disability, protections still exist for those
who contract the virus.94 For example, leave must be provided to
employees who test positive for COVID-19.95 The ADA also
limits inquiries into the health of employees and the medical
examinations that employers are able to conduct.96 EEOC laws
continued to apply during the COVID-19 pandemic, and it had
continued to issue guidance regarding permissible treatment by
employers during the COVID-19 pandemic. The EEOC has issued
disability-under-discrimination [hereinafter Workplace Lawsuits]; U.S.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, TRANSCRIPT OF MARCH 27,
2020 OUTREACH WEBINAR (2020).
89
See Workplace Lawsuits, supra note 88 (discussing Tihara Worthy v.
Wellington Estates LLC). This case has been filed in the New Jersey Superior
Court on June 15, 2020; COVID-19 as a Covered Disability under New Jersey
Law, MASHEL LAW, LLC (Aug. 31, 2020),
https://www.newjerseyemploymentattorneysblog.com/covid-19-as-a-covereddisability-under-new-jersey-law/.
90
Workplace Lawsuits, supra note 88.
91
Id.
92
42 U.S.C. §§ 12111(3), (8); 29 C.F.R. §§ 1630.2(r), 1630.15(b)(2).
93
42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5); see also § 12111(3); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r); Strass v.
Kaiser Found. Health Plan of Mid-Atlantic, 744 A. 2d 1000, 1007 (D.C. 2000)
(noting that a reasonable accommodation can include job restructuring and
reassignment to a vacant position).
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A).
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guidance concerning potentially permissible medical examinations
under the ADA in light of the pandemic, clarifying that
temperature screenings and requirements to receive a negative
COVID-19 test are allowed,97 but tests for anti-bodies constitute
impermissible medical examinations because they do not meet the
ADA’s standards.98 The EEOC has noted that COVID-19
constitutes a “direct threat” under the ADA, allowing employers to
make more “robust medical inquiries than would normally be
allowed.”99 However, EEOC guidance is preempted by CDC
guidance and state public health authorities.100
The ADA also offers guidance about storing employee
medical information, including employee statements regarding the
status of their COVID-19 infection or their suspicion of
infection.101 Additionally, employers may disclose the name and
PII of employees suffering from COVID-19 to public health
agencies, such as a state’s Department of Health or the CDC.102
However, employers may not specifically name the infected
employee to other employees, but may generally inform others that
there was a positive case within their vicinity.103 This makes
contact tracing applications popular tools for tracking the positive
97

What You Should Know About COVID-19 and the ADA, the Rehabilitation
Act, and Other EEO Laws, EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (Sept. 8, 2020)
[hereinafter What You Should Know About COVID-19]
https://www.eeoc.gov/wysk/what-you-should-know-about-covid-19-and-adarehabilitation-act-and-other-eeo-laws.
98
See id.; see also Conroy v. New York State Department of Correctional
Services, 333 F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 2003) (noting that medical examinations
cannot be required unless such examination is shown to be “job-related and
consistent with business necessity”).
99
Taylor Eric White et al., Employer Use of Contact Tracing Apps: The Good,
the Bad, and the Regulatory, LEXBLOG (July 7, 2020),
https://www.lexblog.com/2020/07/07/employer-use-of-contact-tracing-apps-thegood-the-bad-and-the-regulatory/ (citing Pandemic Preparedness in the
Workplace and the Americans with Disabilities Act, EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY
COMM’N (Mar. 21, 2020), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/pandemicpreparedness-workplace-and-americans-disabilities-act).
100
What You Should Know About COVID-19, supra note 97.
101
Joan Farrell, Testing, Exams, and Medical Information, ADA COMPLIANCE
GUIDE ¶ 133 (2020), Westlaw 10992547.
102
Id.
103
Id.
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spread of COVID-19 among employees within a company.104
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(“OSHA”) is a large regulatory agency under the United States
Department of Labor, and has worked with the EEOC and the
ADA to help maintain safe work environments during the COVID19 pandemic.105 Under OSHA’s general duty clause, employers
must provide a place of employment that is “free from recognized
hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death or serious
physical harm”, and this includes protection from COVID-19
infection during work.106 Although contact tracing is not explicitly
mentioned in published guidelines for employers, OSHA
recommends a combination of the use of personal protective
equipment (“PPE”), administrative controls such as changes in
work schedules to stagger employee arrival, and engineering
controls such as installing products to minimize the spread of
viruses, thereby implicitly allowing contact tracing to be
utilized.107
The CDC has also published guidance regarding digital
contact tracing, including that data should be “secure and
confidential, be able to receive input from public health authorities,
facilitate identification of known contacts, and be able to send
notifications of exposure in multiple electronic formats.”108
C. The Use of Contact Tracing Applications to Monitor the Spread
of Respiratory Illness
Considering the guidance of the EEOC and health agencies,
contact tracing can be instituted in the workplace. Employers may
seek to keep their workplaces safe and abide by CDC guidelines by
using contact tracing through the use of web and mobile
104

Id.
See generally COVID-19, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN.,
https://www.osha.gov/SLTC/covid-19/ (last visited Oct. 11, 2020).
106
29 U.S.C. § 654 (1970); OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., NO.
3990-03 2020, GUIDANCE ON PREPARING WORKPLACES FOR COVID-19, 4
(2020) [hereinafter OSHA Guidance] (noting that the General Duty clause
applies to the COVID-19 pandemic).
107
OSHA Guidance, supra note 106.
108
White et al., supra note 99.
105
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applications to identify, track, and warn the close contacts of
infected employees.109
Contact tracing applications typically work by using
Bluetooth or GPS technology to constantly broadcast strings of
random numbers.110 These numbers are broadcasted anonymously
and change every few minutes.111 When two electronic devices
(such as cell phones) that have the application downloaded are in
close contact for a specified amount of time, the two devices
exchange their series of numbers and store these numbers within
each phone’s application.112 When a user of an application tests
positive for COVID-19, the application can let other users know
that they were previously in close contact with someone who tested
positive or exhibited symptoms of the virus.113 Within the private
sector, contact tracing applications may also link proximity or
geolocation data with certain “personally identifiable information
such as names and contact information.”114 In the employment
context, applications can be used for both contact tracing within
the company, and to ensure that employees abide by social
distancing guidelines and other workplace rules.115 When an
employee contracts the virus, the application can inform other
employees that they may have been exposed to the virus based on
their physical location and proximity to the infected co-worker.116
These applications, which have already been used in
several countries, by several U.S. states, and by various businesses
109

Kelly Servick, Cellphone Tracking Could Help Stem the Spread of
Coronavirus. Is Privacy the Price?, SCIENCE MAG (Mar. 22,
2020), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/03/cellphone-tracking-couldhelp-stem-spread-coronavirus-privacy-price.
110
See, e.g., Stephen R. Brown et al., May an Employer Require the Use of a
Contact Tracing App?, 38 NO. 01 WESTLAW J. COMPUT. & INTERNET 02 (2020).
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
JONES DAY, A GUIDE TO NAVIGATING CYBERSECURITY, PRIVACY, AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW ISSUES WITH COVID-19 CONTACT TRACING IN THE PRIVATE
SECTOR 1 (July 2020), https://www.jonesday.com/en/insights/2020/07/a-guideto-navigating-cybersecurity-privacy-and-employment-law-issues-with-covid19contact-tracing-in-the-private-sector.
115
Id.
116
Id.
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in the United States,117 may share proximity and geolocation
tracking data to either a centralized or decentralized source.118
Centralized methods use a computer server to match data and alert
users, while the decentralized method stores data exclusively in
each individual’s phone.119 Adopting the decentralized method
renders a server powerless because Bluetooth tracking does not
require personal information and leaves no trail back to users.120
However, a centralized system involves the use and storage of
personal data, and “puts the server in a position of trust, where it
won’t misuse” that personal information.121 In other words, unlike
a centralized model, a decentralized model would not tell an
employee using the application where they were exposed.122
Notably, the centralized model has been criticized on cybersecurity
grounds as being easier to hack and manipulate.123
Although the ADA has not specifically commented on the
See Patrick Howell O’Neill et al., A flood of coronavirus apps are tracking
us. Now it’s time to keep track of them, MIT TECH. REV. (May 7, 2020),
https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/05/07/1000961/launching-mittr-covidtracing-tracker/, for a database of countries using a COVID-19 contact tracing
application; see Jefferson Graham, Tracking coronavirus: Are Apple and Google
contact tracing apps available in your state?, USA TODAY,
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2020/10/02/apple-google-coronaviruscontact-tracing-apps/3592355001/ (Oct. 5, 2020, 2:06 AM), for the states that
are using contact tracing applications; see Shannon Bond, Your Boss May Soon
Track You At Work for Coronavirus Safety, NPR (May 8, 2020, 2:48 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2020/05/08/852896051/your-boss-may-soon-track-you-atwork-for-coronavirus-safety, for general information about contact tracing
applications in the workplace.
118
Daniel Kahn Gillmor, ACLU White Paper – Principles for TechnologyAssisted Contact-Tracing, AMERICAN CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, (Apr. 16,
2020), https://www.aclu.org/report/aclu-white-paper-principles-technologyassisted-contact-tracing; Joseph Duball, Centralized vs. decentralized: EU’s
contact tracing privacy conundrum, INT’L ASS’N OF PRIV. PROS. (Apr. 28,
2020), https://iapp.org/news/a/centralized-vs-decentralized-eus-contact-tracingprivacy-conundrum/.
119
Leo Kelion, NHS rejects Apple-Google coronavirus app plan, BBC News
(Apr. 27, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-52441428.
120
Duball, supra note 118.
121
Id.
122
Gillmor, supra note 118.
123
Id.
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use of contact tracing, use of contract tracing applications would
likely not be prohibited by the ADA provided that the application
is not more intrusive than necessary to meet the business necessity
standard.124 To meet the business necessity standard, an employer
that intends to require a medical examination must reasonably
believe that an employee’s behavior is a threat to vital functions of
the business based on objective evidence.125 A COVID-19
infection in the workplace would potentially create such a threat,
as it can put employees at risk for contracting the virus. The way
the applications will be implemented, however, will be almost
entirely within each employer’s control.126 Under OSHA’s
General Duty Clause,127 employers must provide a safe work
environment, and COVID-19 has been labelled a disease that
triggers employers’ duties to take affirmative actions to reduce
COVID-19 related hazards.128 Along with guidance from OSHA
and state and local health authorities, employers can implement
additional precautions, such as contact tracing.129
II. DATA USE AND MISUSE
Outside of their immediate homes and communities,
Americans come across the most social interaction, and thus their
greatest potential exposure to COVID-19, at their workplace.130
GOING BACK TO WORK: EMPLOYER USE OF “APPS” ON EMPLOYEE PDAS/SMART
PHONES FOR COVID-19 CONTACT TRACING, ROPES & GRAY (MAY 1, 2020),
https://www.ropesgray.com/en/newsroom/alerts/2020/05/Going-Back-to-WorkEmployer-Use-of-Apps-on-Employee-PDAs-Smart-Phones-for-COVID-19Contact-Tracing; see 42 U.S.C. § 12112(D)(4)(A).
124

125

William Goren, Job Relatedness and Business Necessity Revisited (Jan. 5,
2018), https://www.understandingtheada.com/blog/2018/01/05/ada-job-relatedbusiness-necessity/ (citing Painter v. Illinois Department of Transportation, 715
Fed. Appx. 538, 541 (7th Cir. 2017)).
126
Id.
127
See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
128
White et al., supra note 99.
129
Id. (noting that OSHA requires that employers implement some combination
of Personal Protective Equipment, cloth face coverings, administrative controls,
and engineering controls).
130
NATIONAL SAFETY COUNCIL, POSITION/ POLICY STATEMENT - CONTACT
TRACING, https://nsc.org/getattachment/72ee1419-3d6b-41e2-a614-
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Identifying infected employees, tracking their contacts at work,
and sharing the information with public health agencies like the
CDC can help to minimize exposure in the workplace and in the
country as a whole, especially considering the fact that the United
States lacks a national contact tracing mechanism.131 There are no
federal or state laws prohibiting employers from using contact
tracing applications, and they can be readily initiated at workplaces
around the United States.132
However, while digital contact tracing can be highly
effective at controlling COVID-19 outbreaks,133 provided that
approximately 60 percent of the population installs a contact
tracing application,134 many Americans are worried about the
implications of a contact tracing application at work.135 Part II.A
will examine privacy considerations and concerns as they relate to
digital contact tracing applications. Part II.B discusses the
potential for discrimination based on COVID-19 symptoms or
infection through the use of digital contact tracing. Part II.C
discusses the inadequate protection by the ADA in regard to the
3c31cadc9401/w-contact-tracing-161.
131
Id.
132
White et al., supra note 99.
133
MATT J. KEELING, T. DEIRDRE HOLLINGSWORTH & JONATHAN M. READ,
EFFICACY OF CONTACT TRACING FOR THE CONTAINMENT OF THE 2019 NOVEL
CORONAVIRUS 861 (COVID-19) (2020).
134
Digital contact tracing can slow or even stop coronavirus transmission and
ease us out of lockdown, UNIV. OF OXFORD. (Apr. 16, 2020),
https://www.research.ox.ac.uk/Article/2020-04-16-digital-contact-tracing-canslow-or-even-stop-coronavirus-transmission-and-ease-us-out-of-lockdown (“We
can stop the epidemic if approximately 60% of the whole population use the app
and adhere to the app’s recommendations. Lower numbers of app users will also
have a positive effect; we estimate that one infection will be averted for every
one to two users.”); see also Sidney Fussell & Will Knight, The AppleGoogle Contact Tracing Plan Won't Stop Covid Alone, WIRED (Apr. 14, 2020),
https://www.wired.com/story/apple-google-contact-tracing-wont-stop-covidalone/ (noting that a successful contact tracing application needs fifty to seventy
percent of the population to participate).
135
Digital Contact Tracing, CORONAVIRUS TODAY,
https://www.coronavirustoday.com/digital-contact-tracing (noting that in an
online survey of 2000 people, 71 percent said they would not download a
contact tracing application, and 44 percent of that group cited privacy concerns
as the main reason).
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COVID-19 pandemic and the personal health information of
employees.
A. Information Privacy Considerations
Major privacy concerns related to digital contact tracing
include whether employees will have sufficient notice and means
to choose and consent to digital contact tracing within the
workplace, the quality and standardization of the data collected
through contact tracing applications, and how the information
collected will be used and to whom it will be shared.
1.

Choice/Consent and Notice/Awareness

Whether privacy policies for digital applications used by
employers will adopt the common FIPPs is an important
consideration for those who worry about the safety and security of
their personal information, particularly in regard to the notice and
awareness, and the choice and consent principles.136 Without the
meaningful application of the notice and awareness principle in a
digital contact tracing application, employees may not get a
sufficient amount of information about the collection and use of
their personal information.137
Notice is also particularly important because, without it,
individuals cannot constructively consent to privacy policies. In
Opperman v. Path Inc., the Northern District Court of California
found that there were material issues of fact as to the scope of
consent obtained by Yelp Inc. and whether there was sufficient
consent for Yelp Inc.’s practice of uploading users’ phone
contacts.138 The court noted that consent is only effective if the
user agreed “to the particular conduct, or to substantially the same
136

Aaron M. Baird, Kellen Mermin-Bunnell & Jacon Lesandrini, Ethics of
Digital Contact Tracing by U.S. Employers during the COVID-19 Pandemic,
HEALTH MGMT. POL’Y & INNOVATION (Apr. 30, 2020),
https://hmpi.org/2020/04/30/ethics-of-digital-contact-tracing-by-u-s-employersduring-the-covid-19-pandemic-4-30-gsu-and-wellstar/.
137
Camillo & Kornbacher, supra note 20, at 3.2-III.
138
Opperman v. Path Inc., 205 F. Supp. 3d 1064, 1081 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
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conduct,” and that Yelp, Inc. did not explicitly mention that it
would upload contact information.139 Similarly, with the changing
guidelines on sharing positive COVID-19 cases, employers would
be unable to give adequate notice and could not solicit consent
from employees.140 Thus, employers may not have the ability to
give notice of potential government and third party uses of the data
collected from employees, and employees may not have the
meaningful choice to resist the third party uses.141 Without proper
and conspicuous notice, employees cannot meaningfully consent to
the use and disclosure of their PII, regardless of whether the
application in question utilizes an opt-in or opt-out model of
consent.142 Moreover, it is likely that applications will require
blanket consent at the outset due to the ongoing nature of
employees’ engagement with contact tracing applications.143 This
means that employees may be expected to consent broadly to
future data disclosure and uses without fully understanding them.
In other words, “because the consequences of granting blanket
consent to use one's PII cannot be known at the time the consent is
granted, this mechanism does not allow an individual to exercise
meaningful control over disposition of his PII.”144
There are a number of concerns relating to
notice/awareness and choice/consent regardless of whether the use
of a digital application is mandated or completely voluntary. In the
absence of federal information privacy law on this matter, it is
unknown whether employers can mandate the participation in

139

Id. at 1077.
Camillo & Kornbacher, supra note 20, at 3.2-III; U.S. Department of Labor
Issues Enforcement Guidance For Recording Cases of COVID-19,
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN. NATIONAL NEWS RELEASE (U.S.
Dep’t of Labor, Washington, D.C.), April 10, 2020 [hereinafter OSHA NEWS
RELEASE].
141
Camillo & Kornbacher, supra note 20, at 3.2-III; OSHA NEWS RELEASE,
supra note 140.
142
John A. Rothchild, Against Notice and Choice: The Manifest Failure of the
Proceduralist Paradigm to Protect Privacy Online (Or Anywhere Else), 66
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 559, 633 (2018).
143
Id.; Brown et al., supra note 110.
144
Rothchild, supra note 142.
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digital contact tracing.145
However, it is not expressly
forbidden.146 Mandatory use of contact tracing applications will
effectively remove employees’ ability to consent completely,
because the privacy policies will be completely at the judgment of
employers. Even if the application is facially voluntary, incentives
and coercion may unduly influence employees to participate.
Because of a perceived or actual lack of choice regarding the use
of an application, employees may be stripped of the ability to
meaningfully exercise choice and give consent, especially
considering the tough economic climate, riddled with business
closures and layoffs during the COVID-19 pandemic.147
Conversely, some experts note that contact tracing technology will
be significantly less effective if employees are able to opt-in or
opt-out of using the technology and sharing their data.148 This is
because a significant number of employees must participate in
digital contact tracing for it to be effective, and if too many
employers opt-out, or fail to opt-in, digital contact tracing will not
work as intended.149
The privacy notices given to employees are also at issue. If
privacy notices are open-ended and broad, the resulting consent is
less valid because it would be an agreement to a vague set of
terms.150 Alternatively, if an employer provides excessive detail in
privacy notices regarding the anticipated uses, procedures, and
goals for the data, constructive consent is also not guaranteed
because employees may be overwhelmed by the information given,

145

Brown et al., supra note 110.
Id.
147
COVID-19’s Serious Risks for Economic Rights, Human Rights Watch (June
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especially with a lack of legal experience.151 Moreover, according
to a study by Deloitte, over ninety percent of people do not read
privacy policies and other terms and conditions, citing complicated
language and lack of meaningful choice in using the application or
other digital platforms.152 In another study, researchers created a
fake social networking application and wrote corresponding terms
and conditions in which users would have to agree to give up their
first born child; 98 percent of users agreed to the terms.153 The
study suggested that privacy policies can take up to thirty minutes
for users to read, and most people were not up to the task.154
Moreover, employers may run into issues if they fail to explain
privacy policies, or otherwise fail to provide adequate notice that
they exist. In Nguyen v. Barnes and Noble Inc., the Ninth Circuit
reasoned that while failing to read policies is not a defense, entities
that provide no notice, other than a conspicuous link to a set of
policies, do not alone give users constructive notice of those
policies.155 Thus, simply having a privacy policy for a contact
tracing application, even one that sufficiently addresses the uses
the data will be put to, is not enough to solicit meaningful consent.
2.

Proximity Information and Data Quality

Another criticism of digital contact tracing is that there is no
consensus on how to standardize proximity data received from
Bluetooth contact tracing mechanisms.156 Standardization of data
Id.; see also Brooke Auxier et al., Americans’ Attitudes and Experiences with
Privacy Policies and Laws, PEW RESEARCH. CTR. (Nov. 15, 2019),
https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2019/11/15/americans-attitudes-andexperiences-with-privacy-policies-and-laws/ (noting that only 9% of adults in
the United States read privacy policies before agreeing to the terms).
152
Caroline Cakebread, You’re Not Alone, No One Reads Terms of Service
Agreements (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/deloitte-study91-percent-agree-terms-of-service-without-reading-2017-11.
153
JONATHAN A. OBAR & ANNE OELDORF-HIRSCH, THE BIGGEST LIE ON THE
INTERNET: IGNORING THE PRIVACY POLICIES AND TERMS OF SERVICE POLICIES
OF SOCIAL NETWORKING SERVICES 12 (2018).
154
Id.
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Nguyen v. Barnes and Noble Inc., 763 F.3d. 1171, 1178-79 (9th Cir. 2014).
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is the process of compiling different variables into one data set.157
In this case, standardization is especially difficult when compiling
confirmed positive cases of COVID-19, and symptoms reported by
individuals without positive results, as well as compiling proximity
data and data relating to the duration of exposure.158 Additionally,
it is especially difficult to compile accurate data to identify
exposure to asymptomatic cases, because asymptomatic patients
are less likely to confirm that they are positive for COVID-19.159
This makes the accuracy and reliability of contact tracing data
variable at best.160
Additionally, whether contact tracing
applications will rely on objective or subjective data is relevant in
determining the accuracy of contact tracing mechanisms.161 Using
subjective data, such as the self-reporting of symptoms and
suspected cases of COVID-19, dampens the accuracy of contact
tracing because it is unclear whether those cases are positive or
not.162 However, using only objective data, such as authenticated
test results puts the onus on people to get tested for COVID-19,
whether or not they have symptoms.163
The quality of information received by contact tracing
applications is further at issue for being overprotective.164
157
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Caroline Chen, America Doesn’t Have a Coherent Strategy for Asymptomatic
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https://www.propublica.org/article/america-doesnt-have-a-coherent-strategy-forasymptomatic-testing-it-needs-one (noting that asymptomatic patients were less
likely to get tested and that there was no coherent strategy to test asymptomatic
patients).
160
Ashkan Soltani, Ryan Calo & Carl Bergstrom, Contact tracing apps are not a
solution to the COVID-19 crisis, Brookings (Apr. 27, 2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/techstream/inaccurate-and-insecure-why-contacttracing-apps-could-be-a-disaster/.
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Baird, Mermin-Bunnell & Lesandrini, supra note 136.
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Oct. 24, 2020), https://covid19.nj.gov/faqs/nj-information/slowing-thespread/what-are-common-misconceptions-about-contact-tracing#direct-link
(suggesting that New Jersey’s exposure notification application will only use
positive test results when notifying close contacts).
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Bluetooth signals can travel through walls, and as long as users are
within six feet of each other, the contact tracing application will
log the proximity data even though there is no risk of COVID-19
transmission.165 On the other hand, when a user that does not
receive alerts through the application when someone with COVID19 was nearby, either because the application does not use push
notifications or alerts or because there have been no reported cases
within six feet of the user, a false sense of security may arise and
users may feel less of a need to take precautions, such as using
PPE or staying home from work when experiencing symptoms.166
At work, employees may also choose or be required to leave their
phones in another location, may turn their phones off during
meetings or working hours, may experience bad Wi-Fi connection
or signal during work, or may simply forget to charge their phone
or bring their phone to work on any given day.167 In these
situations, a digital application would also be ineffective.
These accuracy problems cannot be solved by applications
alone; most applications being developed create identification
numbers for users that are not traceable, and there can be no way to
verify accuracy.168 Thus, there is a sizable risk of inaccurate
proximity data.
3.

Information Use and Sharing

Much of the worry regarding contact tracing applications is
the potential for sharing data to third parties, including advertising
companies or law enforcement agencies, as well as the theft or loss

Clusters, NBC N.Y. (Updated Oct. 2, 2020),
https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/coronavirus/cuomo-debuts-new-contacttracing-covid-alert-app-as-new-york-battles-clusters/2646436/.
165
Id.; Teresa Scassa, Jason Millar & Kelly Bronson, Privacy, Ethics, and
Contact Tracing Apps, VULNERABLE: THE LAW AND POLICY OF COVID-19, 6
(Colleen M. Flood et al. eds., 2020) (citing Rob Kitchin, Using Digital
Technologies to Tackle the Spread of the Coronavirus: Panacea or Folly,
MAYNOOTH UNIV. (Apr. 21, 2020).
166
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167
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168
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of data.169
However, many information privacy and data
protection concerns related to digital contact tracing are not new.
People have already become comfortable with opting into the
location services of various applications, for example, and share
personal data with applications and websites on a daily basis that
can then be sold to advertisers or other third parties.170 Digital
contact tracing applications create the same risks for users; without
sufficient controls, a log of a user’s proximity to other users, as
well as users’ health status, can be used and disclosed to third
parties.171 Although individuals may be comfortable giving up
information on other digital applications, they may not be willing
to share their information when it involves their health.172
PII has long been protected by statutes such as the ADA
and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(“HIPAA”).173 However, HIPAA typically does not apply in the
employment context because it only concerns “covered entities,”
which include health care providers, health plans, and healthcare
clearinghouses.174 Most employers do not qualify as covered

169

Adam Schwartz, Two Federal COVID-19 Bills: A Good Start and a Misstep,
ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (May 28, 2020),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/05/two-federal-covid-19-privacy-bills-goodstart-and-misstep; see also Todd Ehret, Data Privacy Laws Collide With Contact
Tracing Efforts; Privacy is Prevailing, REUTERS (Jul. 21, 2020),
https://www.reuters.com/article/bc-finreg-data-privacy-contact-tracing/dataprivacy-laws-collide-with-contact-tracing-efforts-privacy-is-prevailingidUSKCN24M1NL (noting that the Federal Bureau of Investigations has
reported an increase in cyber-attacks during the COVID-19 pandemic).
170
Andrew Crocker, Kurt Opsahl, & Bennett Cyphers, The Challenge of
Proximity Apps for COVID-19 Contact Tracing, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND., (Apr.
10, 2020), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/04/challenge-proximity-appscovid-19-contact-tracing.
171
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White et al., supra note 99.
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Id.; Covered Entities and Health Associates, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/coveredentities/index.html (last visited Nov. 3, 2020). It also applies to “business
associates,” which are defined as any third parties that help a covered entity
carry out its functions, including organizations that transmit PII to Covered
Entities; White et al., supra note 99.
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entities or business associates.175 Besides the protection offered by
the ADA, there is a competing legal obligation to report notifiable
diseases to public health agencies such as the CDC and statespecific agencies.176 Such reported information has traditionally
been “kept private by public health agencies and then reported in
the public domain either in aggregate or in other non-identifiable
ways.”177 However, the use of a third-party application, and more
specifically a contact tracing application, can disrupt the fine line
between privacy and reporting requirements. A few questions
arise, including who holds the right to access digital contact tracing
information, whether the information could impact insurance rates
or access to resources, for example, and whether work
requirements will be affected for those who test positive for
COVID-19.178
B. Potential for Discrimination and Lack of Accessibility
The potential for employment discrimination on the basis
of COVID-19 infection, other related effects of the virus, or the
refusal to use an application is important to consider in addition to
information privacy and data protection concerns. With the use of
contact tracing applications by employers, there may be risks of
denied benefits and lack of workplace access for those who refuse
to give consent to share their data or use a particular contact
tracing application.179 If the use of a contact tracing application is
voluntary, employers can make it an opt-in or opt-out system in
which employees will decide for themselves if they wish to
participate.180 Although this will give employees more decisionmaking ability and independence, without sufficient antidiscrimination mechanisms in place, this may prevent a sufficient
number of people from opting-in or entice a large number of
175

White et al., supra note 99.
Baird, Mermin-Bunnell & Lesandrini, supra note 136.
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employees to opt-out.181 Employees may fear that their health
status will exclude them at work, or deny them benefits consistent
with working at the office.182 For example, employees who test
positive for COVID-19 may fear the stigma associated with it, and
consequently fear that they will be excluded from attractive work
opportunities183, as employers may use health information to
“refrain from hiring, retaining, or promoting job candidates.”184
If data is not sufficiently protected from theft or misuse, employers
could be at risk for receiving higher rates for health, life, and
disability insurance, banks could use it to make loan decisions, and
landlords and housing associations could use the data to make
tenant decisions.185
Other access-related concerns arise as well. Individual
employees may not have cellphones with the capability of
downloading and using a contact tracing application.186 The
application may also lack accessibility to people who are visually
impaired, speak a different language, or are otherwise not familiar
with legal jargon.187 The August 2020 CCPA regulations provide
that privacy notices must accommodate individuals with
disabilities and those who speak languages other than English, but
other proposed bills do not explicitly mandate this.188
C. Inadequate Protections by the ADA

181

N.F. Mendoza, Data researchers at odds: Will Americans opt in or opt out of
COVID-19 contact tracing apps?, TECHREPUBLIC (May 22, 2020),
https://www.techrepublic.com/article/data-researchers-at-odds-will-americansopt-in-or-out-of-covid-19-contact-tracing-apps/ (discussing a study in which 46
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application).
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Although EEOC guidance and the ADA govern, the EEOC has
stated that its laws do not interfere with guidance issued by the
CDC or local public health agencies regarding steps that employers
should take to protect their workplace.189 The changing guidance
from health agencies and the unclear hierarchy between EEOC
guidance and directions issued by public health authorities creates
an unclear question for employers as to which guidance reigns
supreme. Further, the EEOC’s lack of direction about whether
COVID-19 will be considered a disability under the ADA is
leaving a gap open for abusive practices, considering that nondisabilities are not protected to the same extent.190 In Cossette v.
Minnesota Power & Light, the Eighth Circuit held that a plaintiff
need not be disabled to state a claim for the unauthorized gathering
or disclosure of confidential medical information under the
ADA.191 However, plaintiffs must also establish that a violation of
the ADA caused tangible injury.192 Because the misuse of
confidential health information is not enough, employees may have
a difficult time establishing tangible injury if they are
discriminated against or their information is misused.
While they provide helpful guidance, EEOC publications
do not address whether employers may mandate the use of digital
contact tracing.193 Employers are allowed to make disabilityrelated inquiries and submit employees to medical examinations
including mandatory COVID-19 testing and temperature scans
before entering the workplace, because the pandemic was
classified as a direct threat.194 Additionally, the EEOC relied on
CDC guidance and noted that employers may prevent employees
from coming to work if they test positive or have symptoms of the
virus.195
Because of the allowance of certain medical
examinations, and its endorsement by the CDC, it is likely that
189
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contact tracing is permissible under EEOC law, provided that it has
not been expressly prohibited and does not constitute a medical
examination that is more extensive than temperature checks or
mandatory COVID-19 testing.
However, the most unclear aspect of the guidance released
by the EEOC is that employers may follow the advice of local
health agencies and the CDC regarding information needed to
permit an employee’s return to the workplace after travel.196
Employers may also mandate doctor’s notes for employees who
say they cannot return to work.197 In regard to the latter, the EEOC
conceded that employees may need to rely on mechanisms other
than healthcare professionals, who are generally busy during the
pandemic, to generate an equivalent to a doctor’s note.198 It is
unclear what an equivalent to a note from a medical professional
is, and employers would have the power to decide what they will
accept.
Employers must keep medical information confidential
under the ADA, but the EEOC has stated that an employer may
disclose the names of employees who test positive to OSHA.199
However, assuming that a digital contact tracing application would
broadcast and receive anonymous “pings” or proximity data, it
would likely not be considered a disability inquiry under the ADA,
because the numbers would not reveal employees’ medical
information.200 Because this data is thus not protected by the ADA,
it has the potential for abuse, especially if applications fail to
sufficiently anonymize the data. The potential for abuse is twofold
for applications that transmit data to the employer rather than
keeping it on the user’s phone in a decentralized manner.201
The EEOC’s guidance implies that employers can ask
employees to disclose whether employees received an exposure
196

Id.
Id.
198
Id.
199
OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, REVISED
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alert notifying them that they were in close contact with COVID19.202 This has the potential for abuse, especially if employees ask
about exposure alerts employees may have received when they
were out of the office.203 When employees receive an exposure
alert, they may not know whether the exposure occurred in or out
of the office because it will have been received after the exposure
took place.204
Moreover, it is unclear if COVID-19 would be considered a
disability under the ADA. Long-term effects of COVID-19 may
include illnesses that would otherwise be considered statutory
disabilities under the ADA,205 as long as they substantially limit
one or more major life activities, the individual suffering from
such impairment has a record of it, or is regarded as having such
impairment.206 A major life activity can include the operation of a
major bodily function.207 The CDC has advised that long-term
complications may severely affect cardiovascular, respiratory,
renal, neurological, and cognitive functions to an extent yet
unknown.208 In some cases, patients suffered from permanent
neurological damage and up to 40 percent of patients may suffer
some neurological impairment, ranging from subtle changes in
cognition to encephalitis, stroke, and dementia.209 Moreover,
many people who passed away from COVID-19 did not show
neurological damage when they became infected, but later had
brain damage when autopsies were performed.210 Many of the
potential conditions resulting from COVID-19 are permanent, and
would otherwise be classified as disabilities.211 However, the
202
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EEOC has failed to classify COVID-19 itself as a disability,
leaving discrimination law under the ADA in limbo in regard to
the pandemic.
Finally, the ADA does not presently prevent an employer
from requiring employees to upload their list of “keys,” or their
sequence of randomly generated numbers which can show closecontact exposure.212 Additionally, the CDC issued guidance
stating that employers should inform the close contacts and other
employees within the workplace if an employee tests positive.213
While this should be anonymous, and the positive employee’s
name should not be given, the employee who tested positive will
be missing from work during their quarantine, and thus their
anonymity may be surrendered anyway.214 This has potential for
discriminatory practices, abuse, and associated stigma.
III. CONTACT TRACING AND PRIVACY OF HEALTH INFORMATION IN
HARMONY
Although digital contact tracing implicates a number of
privacy concerns, it is an invaluable tool for the control and
eradication of viral outbreaks in the world at large. It is especially
important that effective, yet secure, contact tracing can be used in
the workplace to mitigate the effects of a pandemic on the
economy and to ensure that businesses can stay open safely.
Therefore, there must be a careful balancing to ensure that privacy
concerns are mitigated, and digital contact tracing can be used in
the workplace. Part III.A discusses why COVID-19 should be
classified as a disability under the ADA, Part III.B endorses the
PHEPA bill, Part III.C encourages states to pass broader privacy
laws encompassing the FIPPs, and Part III.D discusses policies in
the workplace which may make contact tracing safer and more
effective.
A. Making COVID-19 a Disability under the ADA
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Much is still unknown about COVID-19 and its effects on
the body.215 The virus can present mild to no symptoms in some,
and severe symptoms necessitating the need for hospitalization,
intensive care, and the use of ventilators in others.216 The risk of
death or serious illness from COVID-19 increases with age, as well
as for people with underlying conditions, such as diabetes, lung
disease, obesity, and heart disease.217 Although the ADA does not
specifically list disabilities covered under it, long-term and chronic
conditions are typically considered disabilities as long as the
illness is a “physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
one or more major life activities,” the individual suffering from
such impairment has a record of it, or is regarded as having such
impairment.218
4.

COVID-19 Fits the Statutory Definition of a Disability

The definition of “disability” is broadly construed in favor
of covering individuals to the maximum extent permitted under the
ADA.219 Under this definition, many underlying conditions that
may subject one to severe symptoms of COVID-19 are considered
disabilities under the ADA.220 A virus like COVID-19 making
those conditions worse, or subjecting one to severe symptoms
because of those disabilities, should also be considered a disability
in these conditions.
However, COVID-19 can and should be labelled a
disability on its own, without the existence of pre-existing
conditions. Due to the potential and high-risk for serious longterm conditions, many of which can be categorized as disabilities
on their own under the ADA, COVID-19 infection should itself be
considered a disability. It would be proper to do so, as COVID-19
215
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42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A).
220
42 U.S.C. § 12102(3)(A); see supra note 205 and accompanying text.

38

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 16:2

easily fits the first prong of the disability definition prescribed by
the ADA. COVID-19 is a physical and mental impairment that
causes difficulty breathing, impaired cognition, or “brain fog,”
fatigue, muscle and joint pain, and a range of long-term
conditions.221 These include neurological, musculoskeletal,
respiratory, cardiovascular, immune, and circulatory conditions
and suffice as physical and mental impairments.222 All of these
listed impairments are symptoms and effects of COVID-19 in a
large number of people. Moreover, one need not have these
symptoms to be considered physically or mentally impaired; it is
enough that an employer may believe an employee has one or
more of these impairments stemming from prior COVID-19
infection.223
COVID-19 also substantially limits one or more major life
activities, because its symptoms and effects on the body may
prevent people from going to work, from getting out of bed, and
from living with the full use of their organs due to the burden of
the virus on such organs.224 Even if an employee is not actively
exhibiting symptoms of these impairments, they may still reach the
threshold for substantial limitation of a major life activity.225
Because COVID-19 substantially limits the use of bodily
functions,226 and substantially limits major life activities, it meets
the first prong of the definition of “disability” under the ADA.227
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5. Making COVID-19 a Statutory Disability would Protect
Employees from Discrimination
Under the ADA, qualified individuals with disabilities are
protected from unfavorable treatment by their employers.228
Individuals with a history of a disability, or those believed by their
employers to have a physical or mental impairment lasting six
months or more, even if they do not have such impairment, are also
protected.229 The ADA protects such individuals from unfavorable
treatment including selective hiring, firing, pay disparity, job
assignment, promotions, layoffs, training, benefits, and other
conditions of employment, as well as harassment for such
disability or impairment.230 If COVID-19 was labelled a disability
under the ADA, individuals who contract it would be protected
from unfair employment practices. This is especially important
considering that digital contact tracing applications may notify
employers when someone contracts the virus as it will have to be
recorded and reported to public health agencies and to OSHA.231
Further, individuals with disabilities are due reasonable
accommodations, such as the ability to work from home for
individuals with COVID-19 infections.232
B. Passing the PHEPA with FIPPs
The CCDPA and PHEPA apply to covered entities, which
are entities that engage in contact tracing or exposure notification
mechanisms.233 Each bill requires covered entities to take steps to
ensure privacy before and after collecting covered data and creates
228
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enforcement mechanisms to ensure that entities comply with their
obligations.234 However, major differences arise between the
CCDPA and the PHEPA bills in regard to the data that is covered.
6.

The PHEPA Should be Passed Instead of the CCDPA

The CCDPA insufficiently covers data collected by contact
tracing applications, as it applies to the most narrow set of data,
including only precise geolocation data, proximity data, persistent
identifiers—or information that can identify individual users—and
personal health information.235 The CCDPA also excludes data
collected by covered entities concerning anyone “permitted to
enter a physical site of operation of the entity,” including
employees.236 The PHEPA, on the other hand, would protect any
information actually linked or reasonably linkable to individuals or
devices that is collected, processed, or transferred as part of a
digital contact tracing mechanism, and applies to all exposure
notification mechanisms, not just those related to the COVID-19
pandemic.237 The PHEPA similarly protects a greater range of
data, and creates a private right of action for violations, which the
CCDPA fails to do.238 The PHEPA provides more protection for
the privacy of employee’s medical data and information received
from digital contact tracing applications.239
7.

Enforcing the FIPPs

The PHEPA also more broadly encompasses the FIPPs,
which offer higher protection for information collected through
234
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digital contact tracing applications. The PHEPA operates on an
opt-in consent model, in which users of contact tracing
applications would have to affirmatively consent to the use of their
data, and have the ability to revoke consent at any time, after
which the employer would have to destroy the data and prevent it
from being used or shared.240 PHEPA also satisfies the
access/participation principle, as it provides that there must be a
reasonable attempt at ensuring the accuracy of data, and
individuals must have the ability to correct their data.241 The bill
also stipulates that there must be reasonable safeguards to protect
the confidentiality and security of data,242 that data must be
destroyed after the COVID-19 emergency is terminated, and that
data should not be linked to individuals in a way that would
identify them,243 thus satisfying the integrity/security principle.
The notice/awareness principle is met in § 3(e), requiring that
organizations collecting, using, or disclosing health data should
provide a clear and conspicuous privacy policy that describes how
and for what purpose the data is collected, to whom it is disclosed,
and the purpose of its disclosure.244 It also specifies that the
privacy policy must describe the organization’s data retention and
security policy, and explain how individuals can file complaints
and exercise their rights under the proposed act.245 Finally, the
enforcement/redress prong is met in § 6, where it describes how
states, the FTC, and private citizens can seek redress for data
breach.246 Outside of the FIPPs, PHEPA also allows for data
minimization and anti-discriminatory practices.247
The CCDPA, on the other hand, does not meet the
minimum standards under the FIPPs, and fails to cover a wide
range of data, including data collected by employers.248 Its state
240
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law preemption provision would “cut back” the legal rights of
individuals in states with broad data privacy laws, including
Californians under the CCPA.249 This would cut back rights to
access data under the access/participation principle and prevent the
right to delete or opt-out of data under the choice/consent
principle.250 The CCDPA also lacks a private right of action, under
the enforcement/redress principle, which would severely limit how
individuals could get redress from data breach.251
C. Passing State Information Privacy Laws Related to Contact
Tracing
If Congress takes no action, information collected by
digital contact tracing applications may be subject to state privacy
regulations, which only exist in some states and often fail to offer
full privacy protection.252 The CCPA is currently the most
protective and broad statute governing the privacy of consumers,
and other states should follow suit. State law should model
California’s CCPA, or should be amended to expressly provide for
a mandatory explanation of privacy policies and avenues for
redress, the permitted use of subjective and objective data in
contact tracing applications with accurate labels, the disallowance
of GPS tracking, and a decentralized model for data storage.
8. Adequate Application of the Notice/Awareness Principle
Beyond a clear and conspicuous written privacy policy, a
verbal explanation of privacy policies involving digital contact
tracing applications should be available for employees to fully
enjoy the notice/awareness principle under the FIPPs. To ensure
that users of digital contact tracing applications actually understand
and know about the application’s privacy policies and avenues of
redress in case of data breach or misuse, the policies should be
249
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conspicuous, clear, without legal jargon, and available to people
with disabilities and those who speak different languages, just like
the CCPA provides.253 Otherwise, the notice/awareness principle
is implicitly violated, and users consequently cannot exercise their
right to opt-in or opt-out.
9.

Proximity Data Tracking and Storage

The use of subjective data in digital contact tracing
applications is another cause for concern.254 Subjective data, such
as the self-reporting of symptoms, can increase applications’
inaccuracy, because it will be unknown whether those cases are
positive or not.255 However, preventing users from submitting
subjective data can impede contact tracing efforts when, in the
event of COVID-19 test shortages or long lines at testing centers,
employees are unable to get tested before displaying symptoms. A
potential solution is to allow both subjective and objective data,
including mere symptoms and official COVID-19 test results, but
labelling them as such in the application. This way, employees will
still be informed of potential and actual risk of COVID-19, while
seeing the potential severity of the exposure.
Further, using Bluetooth rather than GPS tracking would
preserve users’ information and prevent data breach and misuse.
Although Bluetooth can be less accurate, as the signal can travel
through walls and send employees false exposure notifications,256
users’ locations are not logged as part of the mechanism, making it
less likely that users will be tracked and their health information
released or misused.257 With Bluetooth contact tracing, a user’s
temporary identification number rotates frequently, preventing
third parties from tracking individual users over time.258
253
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Alternatively, GPS accuracy decreases indoors, where risk of
transmission is much higher, and entire buildings may fall within
the reporting range of a single GPS point.259 Moreover, GPS
tracking increases battery drain, which can curtail the accuracy of
contact tracing in general.260 Further, there are other privacy
concerns associated with GPS tracking.261 GPS tracking data
consists of sensitive information about users’ activities and
locations, most of which is unrelated to public health purposes.
Any repository of such data can present an encroachment on
individual privacy.262 Users can be identified with location
tracking data, especially in sparsely populated areas where truly
anonymizing data is futile.263
A decentralized model for contact tracing, in which the data
stays on the user’s phone rather than being transmitted to another
database, is ideal to preserve privacy and prevent misuse by
malignant actors.264 Centralized systems operate with personal
data, while the decentralized model will simply inform employees
that they were exposed without offering information regarding
where they were exposed, and from whom.265
10. Collaboration with the EEOC and Public Health Agencies
Finally, there should be continuous collaboration between
states, the EEOC, and public health agencies so that employers can
receive up-to-date information and can amend their privacy
policies accordingly. In light of changing circumstances regarding
259
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COVID-19, states should receive updated information to issue
guidance for employers about the pandemic and where and how
information about infected employees should be shared. This will
ensure that the notice/awareness principle is satisfied; employees
can have updated privacy policies that match the guidance of the
EEOC, the CDC, and local health agencies.
With these explicit additions to state and federal laws,
digital contact tracing can offer far more protection to users and
employees using digital contact tracing applications by informing
users of exposure to COVID-19, while protecting their privacy and
personal information.
D. In the Workplace
Many employers may have had mixed feelings about
smartphones in the workplace, considering they may be distracting
for employees. However, in light of the COVID-19 pandemic and
contact tracing efforts, employers should encourage employees to
carry their phones with them wherever they go. Additionally, to
satisfy the notice/awareness and choice/consent principles,
employers should verbally explain privacy policies as they are
updated and amended. This would further ease employees into
understanding and constructively opting-in or opting-out of contact
tracing applications.
Further, employers should collaborate with the CDC and
other health departments to implement a preparedness and
response plan to consider actions in the event of an outbreak,
collect information in the workplace consistent with privacy
considerations, and conduct workplace hazard evaluation and
prevention activities to prevent the spread of COVID-19 in the
workplace.266 Employers should also transparently communicate
with their employees regarding privacy and anti-discrimination
policies to allow employees to feel comfortable using digital
contact tracing applications during work.
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CONCLUSION
COVID-19 and the necessity of digital contact tracing
applications has brought many privacy issues to light. However,
these concerns do not end with the eradication or mitigation of
COVID-19. There will likely be other pandemics and disease
outbreaks in coming years due to human behaviors like
deforestation and encroachment on diverse wildlife habitats.267
With these behaviors, humans will come in contact with other
species and facilitate the spread of coronavirus illnesses.268
Because of these factors, it is imperative that the world as a whole
establishes mechanisms for effective contact tracing without an
irresponsible imposition on the privacy of individuals using the
mechanisms. To be proactive, privacy concerns with contact
tracing must be mitigated now, before the next outbreak occurs.
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